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Foreword: Shape Shifting in the Law
Abstract
As this issue of the William Mitchell Law Review reflects, a significant dislocation is occurring in the law of
business organizations. Something far more fundamental than a legal definition or any similarly specific
concept is in flux. The legal and philosophical question is not whether a business organization should be able
to engage instrumentally in non-profit activities but rather whether a business organization's purpose may
include something in addition to (and likely prejudicial to) the purely pecuniary interests of the organization's
owners.
Keywords
business organizations, non-profit, "social value" enterprise
Disciplines
Organizations Law





SHAPE SHIFTING IN THE LAW 
Daniel S. Kleinberger† 
It has been said that Hegel teaches us that “something is what it 
is and not another thing,”1 but the idea traces back at least to 
Aristotle.2  Known as the Principle of Identity, this proposition is 
fundamental to logic. 
The proposition is not, however, equally integral to our system 
of law.  Despite stare decisis, “The life of the law has not been logic - 
it has been experience.”3  In the common law, legal labels can 
morph over time, with the label remaining the same while the 
meaning slowly changes.  Sometimes the change is almost 
organic—that is, the alterations comprise embellishments or 
refinements to an essentially unchanged core.  Sometimes the 
alternations turn the core concept on its head, producing a “legal 
fiction.”  As Professor Maine once explained, that term signifies: 
any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the 
fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter 
remaining unchanged, its operation being modified. . . . It 
is not difficult to understand why fictions in all their forms 
are particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They 
satisfy the desire for improvement, which is not quite 
 
       †  Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Founding Director—
Mitchell Fellows Program; A.B. Harvard College, 1972; J.D. Yale Law School, 1979.  
As always, the author’s work depends on the love, support, and insights of Carolyn 
C.S. Kleinberger.   
 1. STEPHEN HOULGATE, THE OPENING OF HEGEL’S LOGIC 364 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 2. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, Book VII, Part 17, 117–18 (NuVision 
Publications 2005) (“Now ‘why a thing is itself’ is a meaningless inquiry (for—to 
give meaning to the question ‘why’—the fact or the existence of the thing must 
already be evident—e.g., that the moon is eclipsed—but the fact that a thing is 
itself is the single reason and the single cause to be given in answer to all such 
questions as why the man is man, or the musician musical, unless one were to 
answer, ‘because each thing is inseparable from itself, and its being one just meant 
this.’ This, however, is common to all things and is a short and easy way with the 
question.)”). 
 3. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
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wanting, at the same time that they do not offend the 
superstitious disrelish for change which is always present.4 
In contrast to judge-made law, a statute can divorce a label 
from its traditional meaning suddenly, often with an oxymoronic 
result (as when the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act refers to a 
computer program as a type of agent5).  The same is true for 
regulations.6  Such “tours de force” even have a nickname—
Humpty Dumpty definitions7—in honor of the egg who considered 
words infinitely malleable.8 
One need not be a legal formalist to believe that conceptual 
continuity has practical advantages.  In addition to causing 
“intellectual confusion,”9 dislodging concepts from their traditional 
moorings carries a heavy risk of unintended consequences.  Likely, 
the more fundamental the conceptual discontinuity, the more 
difficult it is to foresee all the ripples. 
As this issue of the William Mitchell Law Review reflects, a 
 
 4. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 21–22 (17th ed. 1901), quoted in BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Legal fiction”).   
 5. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(6) (1999) (“‘Electronic agent’ means a 
computer program or an electronic or other automated means used 
independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or 
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Thompson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 9 A.3d 112, 118 n.13 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (noting that the Commission to Revise the 
Administrative Procedure Act had by rule defined “de novo” judicial review as 
“review upon an administrative record with the limited additional evidence 
mechanisms”).  
 7. Thomas Haggard, Definitions, 8 SCRIBES J. OF LEGAL WRITING 165, 165 
(2001-2002) (“This kind of definition is sometimes labeled as a Humpty Dumpty 
definition, after the Lewis Carroll character who claimed that he was the absolute 
master of all the words he used.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Umpqua Watersheds v. United States, 725 F.Supp.2d 1232, 1237 
n.4 (D. Or. 2010) (observing that “the Forest Service’s definition of ‘trail’ – ‘a 
route 50 inches or less in width or a route over 50 inches wide that is identified 
and managed as a trail,’ is reminiscent of the words of Humpty Dumpty in Lewis 
Carroll’s classic Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking 
Glass”) (emphasis added) (emphasis in original omitted) (citation omitted).  The 
Umpqua opinion quotes Lewis Carroll, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 188 (Penguin Books 1998) (1865): “When I use a 
word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, it means just what I choose 
it to mean-nothing more nor less.”  Umpqua, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 n.4 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 9. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 126 (1933), quoted in 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Legal fiction is the mask that progress 
must wear to pass the faithful but bleary-eyed watchers of our ancient legal 
treasures. But though legal fictions are useful in thus mitigating or absorbing the 
shock of innovation, they work havoc in the form of intellectual confusion.”). 
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significant dislocation is occurring in the law of business 
organizations.  Something far more fundamental than a legal 
definition or any similarly specific concept is in flux.  For centuries, 
business organizations have served as the legal structures to house 
capitalist activity.  Recently, advocates of “social justice” have begun 
pushing to use business organizations for something other than 
unalloyed business purposes.10  Others have succeeded in 
disconnecting the limited liability company (LLC) from necessarily 
having any business purpose. 
The contributors to this symposium issue view these 
developments optimistically, and perhaps they are correct.  
Certainly, the debate is longstanding as to whether a business 
organization must purely pursue profits.  For example, in 1919, the 
Michigan Supreme Court ordered the Ford Motor Company to pay 
a dividend.11  For the most part, the decision resulted from Henry 
Ford’s own testimony:  
His testimony creates the impression . . . that he thinks 
the Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has 
had too large profits, and that, although large profits 
might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, 
by reducing the price of the output of the company, 
ought to be undertaken. We have no doubt that certain 
sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to Mr. 
Ford, had large influence in determining the policy to be 
pursued by the Ford Motor Company . . . .12 
In contrast, in 1932, the Harvard Law Review published an 
article by E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., entitled For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?13  After acknowledging that “it is undoubtedly 
the traditional view that a corporation is an association of 
stockholders formed for their private gain and to be managed by its 
board of directors solely with that end in view,”14 Dodd stated his 
own view: 
The present writer . . . . nevertheless believes that it is 
undesirable, even with the laudable purpose of giving 
stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking 
 
 10. This term is intended to cover a waterfront of causes, principles, and 
values.   
 11. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).   
 12. Id. at 683–84.  
 13. E.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).   
 14. Id. at 1146–47. 
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managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time 
to the view that business corporations exist for the sole 
purpose of making profits for their stockholders. He 
believes that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, 
has made and is today making substantial strides in the 
direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic 
institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making 
function, that this view has already had some effect upon 
legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased 
effect upon the latter in the near future.15  
The legal (and philosophical) question is not whether a 
business organization should be able to engage instrumentally in 
non-profit activities,16 but rather whether a business organization’s 
ultimate purpose may include something in addition to (and likely 
prejudicial to)  the purely pecuniary interests of the organization’s 
owners.  As the Michigan Supreme Court stated in Ford: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of 
the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change 
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.17 
When we abandon this paradigm, the “ripples” of 
consequences are substantial.  For example, the liability shield for 
owners of business organizations is justified as necessary for 
entrepreneurial activity.  What policy or principle supports the 
shield for owners of a family vacation home?18  According to the 
 
 15. Id. at 1147–48 (emphasis added). 
 16. See, e.g., A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953) 
(“[T]here is no difficulty in sustaining, as incidental to their proper objects and in 
aid of the public welfare, the power of corporations to contribute corporate funds 
within reasonable limits in support of academic institutions. But even if we confine 
ourselves to the terms of the common-law rule in its application to current 
conditions, such expenditures may likewise readily be justified as being for the 
benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed strictly in 
terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system.”); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (“In discharging the duties of the position of 
director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider 
[inter alia] the interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and 
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal 
considerations . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 17. Ford, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 18. See J. William Callison, Nine Bean-Rows LLC: Using the Limited Liability 
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Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: “A limited liability 
company may have any lawful purpose, regardless of whether for 
profit.”19  This language certainly permits non-profit limited liability 
companies, but is it wise to use the LLC for such purposes?20  As to 
hybrid business/social organizations, the issues are myriad.  For 
example, managerial accountability is difficult enough in an 
unabashedly for-profit enterprise.  How will owners hold managers 
liable when a purportedly value-driven decision produces 
financially crippling results?21  From a broader perspective, should 
the government perform a branding function, creating a special 
form of quasi-capitalist enterprise, or should such “social value” 






Company to Hold Vacation Homes and Other Personal-Use Property, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 592 (2012). 
 19. REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT, § 104(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 20. See generally Callison, supra note 18 (examining the use of LLCs for 
vacation homes and personal-use property); David S. Walker, A Consideration of an 
LLC for a 501(c)(3) Nonprofit Organization, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627 (2012) 
(considering the use of an LLC for nonprofit tax-exempt organizations).  The 
Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act’s Comment cautions care: 
The subsection does not bar a limited liability company from being 
organized to carry on charitable activities, and this act does not include 
any protective provisions pertaining to charitable purposes.  Those 
protections must be (and typically are) found in other law, although 
sometimes that “other law” appears within a state’s non-profit 
corporation statute. 
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 104(b) cmt. 
 21. See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 817 (2012) (discussing the increasing adoption and utility of benefit 
corporations). 
 22. See generally Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company for Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772 (2012) 
(providing background information regarding the creation and use of low-profit 
limited liability companies (L3Cs) and explaining “The Truth About L3C 
Legislation”).  This criticism is only one of many this author and others have made 
of the L3C.  See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related 
Investments by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); J. William Callison & 
Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not 
Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 
VT. L. REV. 273 (2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s 
New Clothes” on the Low Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 
(2010). 
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Nonetheless, progress typically involves a dialect, and the thesis 
and theme of this symposium issue are largely optimistic and often 
quite pragmatic.  I believe you will learn from the articles.  I have. 
 
Daniel S. Kleinberger 
